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DRUNKENNESS AS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
Jerome Hal*
which time," states Blackstone, "the
statute presumes the offender will have
regained his senses, and not liable to
do mischief to his neighbors." 5 This
comment on the underlying purpose of
the statute is important. In this regard, it must be stated at the outset
that the title of this paper is misleading
in the same way that thinking about
the problem to be discussed is generally
confused. It is necessary to fix a correct perspective. "Drunkenness" denotes a physical and mental state of
being which may be found in an individual in the privacy of his room where
a lone drinker dissipates a melancholy
view of life; it may be found at respectable parties where the bons
vivants gather to celebrate the latest
football victory. In these cases, no
criminal offense is committed 8-- whatever be the degree of intoxication or its
creatures of God . . ."
The penalty for each conviction was 5 prevalence, and whatever the moralist
shillings; if the offender was unable to or theologian has to say about vice.
"Mere drunkenness," writes Bishop,
pay this fine, he was to be "committed
to the stocks for every offence, there to "with no act beyond, is not indictable
T
remain by the space of six hours," "by at the common law." It is essential

Consumption of intoxicating liquor,
and efforts to control anti-social results
are well-nigh universal phenomena.
From the laws of the ancient Hebrews"
and the discourses of the Greek phi3
losophers 2 to the Anglo-Saxon dooms,
and down to the present time, control
of the harmful social effects of drunkenness has been a matter of public concern.4 The first great English statute
on the subject was enacted in 1606 (4
Jac. I, c. 5). Its preamble provided:
"Whereas the loathsom and odious
sin of drunkenness is of late grown into
common use within this realm, being
the root and foundation of many other
enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing,
murder, swearing, fornication, adultery,
and such like, to the great dishonor of
God, and of our nation, the overthrow
of many good arts and manual trades,
the disabling of divers workmen, and
the general impoverishing of many good
subjects, abusively wasting the good

* Professor of Law, Indiana University Law
School. Author: Theft, Law and Society (1935),
Readings in Jurisprudence (1938), and various
articles.
The writer wishes to acknowledge the valuable help of Mr. Loren McGregor, Student Assistant, Indiana University Law School.
This paper was presented at the annual
meeting of the Research Council on Problems
of Alcohol under the auspices of the A. A. A. S.
at Philadelphia, December 29, 1940. It is a modification of the paper published in the Quart. J.
Studies on Alcohol, March, 1941.
1Deut. XXXI, 18, 19, 20, 21; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Gal.
V, 21.
2 Plato, Laws, 666, 673.

3 2 Westermarck The Origin and Development
of Moral Ideas 339, refers to the prohibition
laws of Hlothhaere and Eadric.
4 For a brief survey of the early history of
legal control of drunkenness, see Disney, A
View of Ancient Laws against Immorality and
Profaneness (1729) Tit. VI, 257-271.
54 BL 64.
s See Pugh v. S. (Tex., 1909) 117 S. W. 817,
and generally 30 Am. Jurisp. 294.
7Cf. "Intoxication is not a crime in itself,
and in so far as I know has never been constituted a crime by statute." Mr. Justice Boyle in
McRae v. McLaughlin Motor Car Co. (1926) 1
D. L. R. 377, 378.
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to grasp this fully. It is not the drunk-

cases, is for the serious crime or none

enness but the injury to other persons,
committed under the influence of alcohol that is relevant in law.8
Many Forms of Drunken Behavior
It has long been known, though

at all. Hence-so far as prosecution
is concerned- the various offenses in
which drunkenness is an essential element of the crime are relatively minor

vaguely, that drunkenness is intimately
connected with a wide variety of forms
of criminal behavior. Crimes committed under alcoholic influence are characterized by violence or negligence.
The former extend from creating a
nuisance through boisterous conduct in
public places, at one extreme, to homicide, at the other. With the advent of
the automobile, criminal negligence has
become a matter of first importance. A
thorough study would include all types
of crime committed under the influence
of alcohol. There is no such study in
English.' We do not know how many
crimes are committed under the influence of alcoholic liquor; so far as
I am aware, apart from so-called
drunkenness, (i.e., disorderly conduct
in public, aggravated by intoxication),
drunken driving, and violation of liquor laws, our statisticians have made
little or no effort to discover the incidence of intoxication in criminal behavior.10 They have followed existing
administrative practices. Where a major
crime has been committed under influence of alcohol, there is naturally no
interest in prosecution for drunkenness; conviction, in practice in such
8 See Ramey v. S. (Ga., 1929) 151 S. E. 55. But
cf. Com. v. Conlin 184 Mass. 195. See infra for
"Common
exceptions concerning
apparent
drunkards, in a small minority of states."
9 Cf. Barbier, Le Delit Alcoolique (Paris,
1930) 19 pp.
1o Cf. the French criminal statistics.

11 1 J. Cr. L. & Criminol. No. 2, p. 100.

ones. The following analysis will be
confined to these offenses, specifically
and to
to so-called drunkenness
drunken driving.
The importance of these offenses cannot be exaggerated. We deal here with
phenomena so widespread, so frequent,
so traditional, that they concern the
everyday life of the entire community.
Consider the following fragmentary but
nonetheless highly significant data:
Some years ago it was determined that
from one-half to two-thirds of all convictions in the minor courts of New
York were for drunkenness.I'In Massachusetts, arrests for drunkenness in
1935 were almost three times as numerous as arrests for all other offenses
excepting those for motor vehicle and
traffic violations.2 Los Angeles reported 41,878 arrests for drunkenness
in 1939.13 In the District of Columbia,
of all persons committed to jail in the
first three months of this year, 80.1%
were guilty of intoxication. 4 The national situation is quite inadequately
described in the Uniform Crime Reports. Yet they show that almost onefourth of all arrests reported for the
six months' period, January 1 to June
30, 1940, consist of drunkenness and
12

Zottoli, The Problem of Alcoholism in the

Courts p. 5.
13 Tentative Draft, Committee on Tests for
Intoxication, 1940 Report to National Safety

Council.
14 Source: Persons Admitted Under Fine to
the Baltimore City, and D. C. Jails, Jan. to
March, 1940, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Wash., October 15, 1940.
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drunken driving. When it is considered that truly vast numbers of such
cases are not reported to the police;
that in vast numbers of such cases
known to the police, arrests are not
made; and that vast numbers of such
arrests are not reported by the police,
or, as in Baltimore, are simply lumped
with "disorderly conduct," some notion
of the prevalence of drunkenness and
drunken driving may be gained. Despite this, it is the shocking fact that
in this country, we have only just begun the collaboration between scientists and legal scholars which alone can
help in the solution of this aggravated
social problem. I wish to consider
briefly some of the relevant legal questions, each of which deserves the most
painstaking investigation possible.
Legal Problems
First, let me present a general view
of the statutory law on this subject.
Forty states make intoxication (usually specifying "public") a criminal
offense. In eight states, the various
municipalities regulate this offense. The
statutes typically forbid "boisterous
or indecent conduct, or loud or profane
discourse in any public place or near
any private residence, not his own,"
while intoxicated. 15 Some of the statutes are not explicit as to appearance
in public, yet they are almost wholly
construed as requiring that. 6
Numerous statutes penalize special
classes-professional people and per".5Ala. Code of 1928, Ch. 120, sec. 3883.
16 But see footnotes 36 and 44.
Various statutes make it a misdemeanor for
any habitual drunkard "to be found" in a
saloon, billiard or bowling alley, house of ill-

sons engaged in work that requires a
high degree of care to avoid public
injury. Thus about 15 states make it
a misdemeanor for employees in charge
of trains to be intoxicated. About the
same number penalize various public
officers for intoxication while on duty.
Many states make it a misdemeanor for
a physician to be intoxicated while acting in his professional capacity. Many
states have statutes dealing with intoxication (usually "habitual") by dentists, nurses, optometrists, pharmacists,
lawyers, osteopaths, chiropractors, administrators, executors, guardians, barbers, jurors, architects, prison officers,
and others; these provide for either
temporary or permanent revocation of
license, or discharge from employment.
Every state, I believe, has one or more
statutes dealing with drunken driving. 7 In a few states, statutes forbid
carrying or discharging a gun while
hunting, if under the influence of liquor. Other statutes concern drunkenness near special places, e.g., churches
and hospitals, where boisterous conduct
is particularly resented.
No doubt experience and reason support some of the above legislation; some
of it is of ancient origin; the general
purposes have long been recognized as
sound. But it by no means follows that
legislation in this field has benefited in
the least from recent scientific discoveries, from advance in social science,
or even from progress in legislative
drafting. That this legislation is by and
fame, etc., cf. for Colorado, 2 Hill's Stats. Sec.
1944.
17 For a summary of these statutes, see Motor-

Vehicle Traffic Conditions in the U. S. pp. 77-81.
U. S. Gov't. Prtg. Office, 1938.

JEROME HALL

large a haphazard, unorganized, vague,
and dull-pointed instrument of social
control, is evident by examination of
18
the statute books of any jurisdiction
in light of common knowledge of the
relevant social problems.
The laws themselves are extraordinarily ambiguous. Among the most
troublesome problems is what would
seem to be the most simple of all, namely, the meaning of "drunkenness." In
some states no distinction is made between that and being "under the influence" of liquor. An Alabama court
asserted that "the difference is that of
Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum. If a
man is under the influence of intoxi19
cating liquors, he is intoxicated." On
the other hand, a Florida court held
that "Though all persons intoxicated
by the use of alcoholic liquors are
under the influence of intoxicating
liquors, the reverse of the proposition
is not necessarily true."20 An Arkansas
court avoided all difficulties by the
illuminating remark that, "It may be
well doubted whether the terms
'drunkenness' and 'soberness' are susceptible to any accurate definition for
practical purposes, as they sufficiently
define themselves.

' 22

The legal defini-

tions of "drunkenness" range from
Blackstone's "artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, which, depriving men
of their reason, puts them in a tem18 Some advance has been made in certain
English statutes which quite properly distin-

guish and penalize more severely if the drunken
person is in possession of firearms or in charge
of a child under seven, and the like. Licensing
Act, 1902, S. 2. In this country, it has been
urged that drunkenness by a pedestrian on a
highway should be more severely dealt with
than at present; in view of the fact that such
persons are a danger not only to themselves,
but also to motorists and to other pedestrians

porary phrensy . . ,,23 to "a person
so under the influence of liquor as not
to be entirely himself is intoxicated,
yet he may not betray it by either
movement or word and his condition
may not be discernible by his intimate
friends.12 4 A Texas court sought fine
distinctions. "A man is said to be 'dead
drunk' when he is perfectly unconscious-powerless. He is said to be
'stupidly drunk' when a kind of stupor
comes over him. He is said to be
'staggering drunk' when he staggers in
walking. He is said to be 'foolishly
drunk' when he acts the fool. All these
are cases of drunkenness; of different
25
An Idaho
degrees of drunkenness.1
intoxicated
Court declared that "to be
. . . he need not have reached a state
2
An Illinois Court
of drunkenness."
and 'intoxicated'
"'Drunk'
asserted:
27

are synonyms."
Can one make any sense whatever
out of these diversities de la lei? To
some extent these divergencies may be
explained by the fact that in some states
the drunken driving statutes include
one or the other term. Thus, as in
California, when the statute penalizes
driving "under the influence," etc., the
cases will naturally deal with that, and
not with "intoxicated," except incidentally. Other divergencies may be
explainable by the fact that the terms
are differently construed when the
(where the motorist swerves to avoid striking
the inebriate), there is good ground for considering such proposals.
ig Holley v. State, 144 So. 535.
2o Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214; 107 So. 360.
22 . Co. v. Hamilton, 84 Ark. 81.
23 4 Bl. 26.
2t Paris, etc., B. Co. v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 482.
25 Id.
26 Packard
27

v. O'Neil, 262 Pac. 881, 884.

P. v. Rowland, 335 Ill. 432.
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same court deals with different statutes. Thus in the Florida case, quoted
above, the court was contrasting "under
the influence" as it appeared in a traffic
law with a statute making it manslaughter to cause death by automobile
while "intoxicated." If all the difficulties could be accounted for on such
grounds, each jurisdiction might achieve
reasonable legal certainty by careful
interpretation of its various statutes.
Such certainty would be largely verbal;
but the difficulties run much deeper
than that. Such divergencies and
ambiguities as those indicated obstruct
analysis enormously. They mask real
problems that can be solved only by
well-directed research. Such variances
as those discussed, cumulate, confuse
and block efforts at basic clarification.
The problem is one which requires a
fresh beginning, and thorough study
by scholars collaborating in the various
relevant disciplines.
A second problem in connection with
the interpretation of these terms in
drunken driving statutes concerns the
degree of influence or intoxication prdscribed. In this connection, it is apparent that the dangerous driver is not the
"dead drunk," but is, rather, the one
who can still operate the vehicle but
less ably than when normal, who is less
cautious and less able to meet an unexpected situation with sufficient speed.
An Arizona court held that the slightest degree of lessened ability through
28
use of intoxicating liquor was illegal.
Perhaps more precise is the California
decision of impairment "to an appre28 Hasten v. S.
29 P. v. Dingle

2DO Pac. 670.
56 Cal. App. 445.

ciable degree, '29 of ability to operate
a car. Going beyond that, a New Jersey
Court held that "one driving an automobile on a public street while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor
offends against the . . . Act even
though he drives so slowly and so skill.
fully and carefully that the public is not
annoyed or endangered."3 0 Quite apart
from the problem of precise terminology, there arise certain questions of
fact and of policy in connection with
this problem. It is unsafe driving that
is the evil-not the "mere drunkenness." Proscription beyond overt behavior might well open the door to
abuse by police; and it must never be
forgotten that prevention of such abuse
is as important as is prevention of
harmful behavior by the lay citizenry
-perhaps more so. On the other hand,
it is sometimes asserted that any
amount of alcohol, however slight,
diminishes driving ability. This is a
question of fact, still to be determined.
For legal purposes, we must be confined to perceptible lessened ability,
even though the ideal may well be to
make the offense provable by facts
other than reckless or negligent driving. Just how this could be worked
out is a difficult problem. Preservation
of life is offset by mores that oppose
sumptuary legislation, and by values
that insist upon legal guarantees
against official abuse. Nor can limits
of effective enforcement of any sweeping law be ignored. Thus, for the
present at least, the proper standard
would seem to be that of safe driving;
so State v. Rogers, 91 N. 1. L. 212.
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in the nature of the case, it is impossible to formulate it any more definitely than driving with "due care under
the circumstances."
A third problem concerns what the
lawyers rather indiscriminately call
the "subjective" and "objective" tests.
Should the driving (allegedly under
the influence of alcohol) be compared
with the defendant's own driving at
other times, or with the driving of "an
ordinary prudent, reasonable man"
under the same circumstances as in
the case at hand? A Committee of the
National Safety Council recommends
the former test as the fairer. "It is
felt," they say, "that the better definition compares the individual alleged to
be under the influence with himself at
normal."'3 1

In

like vein an Arizona

court held: "The important query is,
'Was the driver of the vehicle under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to
the extent that he did not have the
clearness of intellect or control of himself that he otherwise would have
had?'

""

On the other hand, in Cali-

fornia the standard is the manner in
which "an ordinarily prudent and
cautious man in the full possession of
his faculties, using reasonable care,
would operate or drive a similar vehicle,
under like conditions.

' 33

The problem

is really a very complicated one. The
test of how a "reasonable man" would
have acted is employed in manslaughter
cases and generally in cases of crim31 Tests

for

Driver

Intoxication,

National

Safety Council (1937) p. 21.
32 Weston v. State, 65 Pac. (2d)
(Ariz.) 652.
33 P. v. Dingle, 56 Cal. App. 445.
So, too a
New York court held "Hence for the purposes
of the statute under which defendant is con-

inal negligence. Since the penalties
are relatively slight in drunken driving cases as compared with those for
manslaughter, it is apparent that if the
application of the subjective test is unfair, it is much less so in the former.
In these, also, the cases are so very
numerous that, as a matter of practical
administration, it is thought to be necessary to apply a simple, objective
standard despite the fact that it may
be unjust in a small number of particular cases. Beyond that, the paramount
need for maintenance of minimum
standards of traffic performance also
indicates the superiority of the "reasonable man" test. But I do not wish
to give the impression that the issue is
not debatable. No one can rest content
with a rule that penalizes morally
innocent persons. For my part, I should
want to explore the possibility of
reconciling the two objectives: maintenance of minimum traffic standards
and justice to each accused person.
A fourth major problem concerns
the terms "common drunkard" and
"habitual drunkenness." In Rhode
Island, "every person who shall have
been convicted three times, within a
period of six months of intoxication,
or who shall be proved to have been
thus intoxicated three times within the
period of six weeks, shall be deemed
a common drunkard." A Massachusetts statute declares that a "common
drunkard" may be punished for vavicted, he is intoxicated when he has imbibed
enough liquor to render him incapable of giving
that attention and care to the operation of his
automobile that a man of prudence and reasonable intelligence would give." People v. Weaver,
188 App. Div. 395.
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grancy, but does not define the term.
In a Massachusetts case, 4 the court
held that a "common" drunkard must
not only have the habit of getting
drunk, but must, also, offend the public peace and order. The word "common" thus seems to be used there in
the sense of "public.

' 35

A Wisconsin

court, on the other hand, convicted a
defendant of vagrancy as a "common
drunkard" though he was intoxicated
in his own home.3 6

Apparently, the

term was there interpreted to mean an
"habitual drunkard.

'37

When used in statutes requiring that
an "habitual drunkard" be placed in
an institution for a cure, most of the
cases hold that the term means a person who, as a result of drinking intoxicating liquor, is incapable of taking
care of himself or his property. "The
trend of legislation is to treat habitual
drunkenness as a disease of mind and
body, analogous to insanity, and to put
in motion the power of the state, as the
guardian of all of its citizens, to save
the habitual drunkard, his family, and
society from the consequences of his
habit. It is not a penal but a paternal
statute. This statute is limited to per34 Commonwealth v. Whitney, 71 Mass. 85,
(1855).
35 Commonwealth v. McNamee, 12 Mass. 285
(1873) and State v. Savage, 7 So. 183 (Alabama,
1890) hold that a common drunkard must be an
habitual drunkard.
36 Pollon v. State, 261 N. H. 224, (1935). The
Wisconsin statute on drunkenness provides that
the person be found "in any public place." Sec.
351, 59.
37 The Iowa statute provides that: "A habitual
drunkard is a vagrant. He may be kept in the

common jail for any time, not exceeding six
months, at hard larbor." Code of Iowa, sec.
13385. So, too, La. Dart's Cr. Stats. 1932, sec. 1233.
38 Leavitt v. City of Morris, 117 N. W. 393,
(Minnesota, 1908).

sons who have lost the power or will
to control their appetite for intoxicating liquors, and have a fixed habit of
drunkenness, who are in need of care
and treatment, and to those it would
be dangerous to leave at large." 38
Again, the courts hold that the term
has quite a different meaning when
used in statutes prohibiting the sale of
liquor to "habitual drunkards." Thus
a Texas Court declared: 39 "It is here
used in common acceptation, and the
capacity of a person to take care of
himself or property is not in issue, and
is immaterial."' 0 A number of divorce
cases hold that an "habitual drunkard"
is one whose habit it is to get drunk,
and that it is not necessary that he lack
will power to control his appetite for
drink or be unable to carry on his
business. 41 Other divorce cases, how-

ever,4 2 hold that there must be inability
to control the appetite. Finally, cases
dealing with the removal of a public
official from office 43 because of "habitual drunkenness," hold that "the
phrase, 'habitual drunkenness,' must
be construed with reference to the
particular mischief intended to be
remedied by the law-makers. If drink39 Campbell v. Jones, 21 S. W. 723, (Texas,
1893).
40 Cf. Wilson v. White, 69 S. W. 989, (Texas,
1901); Lester v. Sampson, 180 S. W. 419, (Missouri, 1915).
41 See Page v. Page, 86 P. 582 (Washington,
1906); Walton v. Walton, 8 p. 110 (Kansas,
1885); Richards v. Richards, 19 Ill. App. 465
(1886); and Burns v. Burns, 13 Fla. 376. Cf.
"he is, nevertheless, an habitual drunkard if his
habit injures his health, affects his capacity to
carry on his trade or business, disables him
from supporting his family, or from properly
carrying out his duties as a married man and
a father." Korth v. Korth, 33 N. Z. L. R. 290
at p. 292.
42 Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318 (1911).
43 State v. Savage, 7 So. 183, (Alabama, 1890).
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ing renders the incumbent practically
or morally unfit for office he is classed
as an habitual drunkard."

medical and social scientists, one that
holds the promise of abundantly worthwhile discoveries as the result of such
joint research.

Thus, it is apparent that we encounter serious difficulties concerning repetition of the offense. The best clue to
disentangling the various meanings, is
that the lines of distinction seem to
run in terms of the purposes of the
various enactments. Generally, a common drunkard is a repeater in public
places, but not a chronic alcoholic. An
"habitual drunkard" may mean a repeater, but not in public44 and not a
chronic alcoholic; it may mean one
who neglects his wife, and aggravates
that misconduct by frequent intoxication; it may mean a diseased person
who cannot look after himself, and so
on. These distinctions are significant
in law because different consequences
are attached to the respective determinations. But are the distinctions sound
empirically? Especially, are the distinctions drawn between "common
drunkards" and diseased alcoholics
sound? The problem is, again, much
more than a linguistic or a technically
legal one. Nor can one assume that
the medical experts have the answers
ready at hand for they are in sharp
disagreement even as to what constitutes "chronic alcoholism." 45 Obviously there is here indicated a broad field
for collaboration of legal scholars and

I have urged that instead of thinking about drunkenness as a crime in
itself, the need is to consider various
situations, activities, instrumentalities,
and professions, fraught with unusual
danger when the various actors are
under the influence of liquor. The
description of the various relevant
behaviors is one part of the legislative
task; it includes that particular element
of this criminal behavior designated
by the term "intoxicated" or "under
the influence of liquor." The question
I wish to raise now concerns the aptness of regarding evidence of any specific per cent of alcohol in the brain
as proof of being "under the influence"
or "intoxicated" in any and all cases.
It is with this question in mind as
well as that concerning improvement
in trial procedure, that I should like to
call attention briefly to the well-known
chemical tests to determine intoxication. For the most part, in this country, we still depend on ordinary
observation to provide proof of intoxication-staggering, drowsiness, boisterousness, inability to enunciate clearly,
and the like. Such behavior may, however, be caused by many conditions
other than alcohol: by certain diseases,

44This apparently contradicts the general
view that criminal drunkenness is public.
45 "Opinions as to what constitutes chronic
alcoholism vary widely. At one extreme stand
those who maintain that the daily moderate
use of beer or wine at dinner constitutes
chronic alcoholism, while at the other extreme
are those who insist on constant intoxication

as the criterion for such a diagnosis. The
writer reserves the term chronic alcoholism for
those whose drinking interferes with their normal occupational and social activities, whether
this occurs constantly or periodically." Merrill Moore, The Intoxications, Modern Medical
Therapy in General Practice, 1940, p. 1148.
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shock, various physical impediments,
etc."6 The usual testimony can accordingly be readily opposed-and the
burden of proof beyond any reasonable
doubt is on the prosecution.

In an

effort not to supplant but to supplement the usual testimony by objective
tests, many experiments have been
made in recent years on the correlation
of alcohol in the brain with that in
various body substances, especially

blood, urine, spinal fluid, and breath.
A substantial and respectable literature
has grown up on the subject; there is
neither need nor opportunity to review
it here.'7 I believe that most writers

on the subject are agreed that the tests,
if very carefully made, have some value
to determine the issue of intoxication.
But many doubts have been raised,

especially concerning alcoholic tolerance and other variations induced by
the state of health, the contents of the
stomach, the form of liquor taken, etc.
One expert in this field asserts that
"all people are under the influence of
alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 per cent (3/20%) ."148It is
evident that it is necessary to determine
just what is meant by being "under
the influence"-and we have noted the
difficulties which the courts have in
this regard; and, secondly, assuming
that agreement on this can be reached
46 "Medical authorities state that there are

about 60 pathological conditions that produce
one or more of the same symptoms in the human body as alcohol." Tests for Driver Intoxication (1937) Presented at Twenty-Sixth National Safety Congress, p. 6, pub. by National
Safety Council, Chicago.
47 See Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal
Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Ia. L. Rev. 191; cf. Vold, Laboratory Tests for Alcoholism in Motor Accident
Prosecutions (1938) 17 Nebr. L. Bul. 251.

by qualified persons, what about the
specific percentage stated above?
Based upon the above formula, a
recent Indiana statute on drunken driving provides that "Evidence that there
was, at the time, fifteen hundredths per
cent, or more, by weight of alcohol in
his blood, is prima facie evidence that
the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor sufficiently to
lessen his driving ability within the
meaning of the statutory definitions of
the offenses.

14 9

This means that such

evidence is deemed so trustworthy
that any and all persons whose blood
contains 15 hundredths per cent alcohol must be found guilty of drunken
driving, in the absence of any contradictory evidence. The judge or jury
may accept such evidence as proof
beyond any reasonable doubt. As
noted, I think the tests have some probative value; I should be willing to
argue for the admissibility of such evidence upon proper safeguards as to the
testing being assured. But I am somewhat dubious of an inflexible rule
because highly qualified experts deny
the validity of the tests. 50 It may very
well be that the above tests are valid
for drunken driving, and that the
problem in this regard is solely one of
education. Much more questionable
are assertions that it is possible to lay
*8Dr. R. N. Harger, Indiana University
School of Medicine, in Indiana State Police
Drunkometer School, June 1940, p. 12.
49State Highway Traffic Act (1939) Act V.
par. 54 (2), and see Recent Developments in
Chemical Tests for Intoxication under the Mo-

tor Vehicle Laws (1940), 1 Quart. Jour. Studies
on Alcohol 182-9.
50 See Vold, op. cit. supra; also Dickson, The
Medico-Legal Aspects of Drunkenness (1935)
3 Medico-Legal and Criminal. Rev. 280; alco C.
Slot, id. 283, 289.
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down a single specific percentage to
determine "under the influence" for
all activities. But a very small percentage of alcohol in the brain might
diminish ability to pilot an aeroplane;
a greater percentage might not diminish ability to drive an automobile safely; and a very much greater percentage
might not prevent the same individual
from walking home without interference to anyone.5 1 It is apparent that
there must be further study of the
problems along the lines indicated
before sound legal control can be
established.
Penalties and Treatment
As regards legal penalties and treatments, I shall be quite brief. A variety
of sanctions is employed: fine, revocation of driving license (40 states),
impounding of the vehicle if it is registered in the defendant's name (7
states), revocation of license to practice
certain professions, removal from
office, imprisonment, and hospitalization. There is little uniformity in this
regard among the various states. The
penalties for drunken driving, for
example, include imprisonment for the
first offense, in five states; fines but no
imprisonment in two states; and the
rest provide fine or imprisonment, or
both. There is very wide range in the
amount of the fine. 2 Delaware imposes
a fine of fifty cents for every intoxica. i Dr. Harger's figures are given in connection with driving an automobile.
52 The above statistics are from Motor-Vehicle Traffic Conditions in the U. S. U. S.
Government Prtg. Office, 1938.
53This is rare in American States. The
French Code Penal provides that persons found
intoxicated in public shall be taken to a place

tion; in New Jersey it costs one dollar.
Florida apparently allows a fine of
$3,000 and imprisonment for three
years, or both, for the second offense.
In Massachusetts, the court may discharge an offender, "if satisfied that the
accused has not four times been
arrested for drunkenness within a
year." 3 The Arkansas statute provides
for confinement until sober.5 4 These
extreme variations in penalty cannot
be justified on any rational basis known
to me. They speak eloquently for the
need of thorough study of penal and
treatment methods which affect hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens annually.
A random selection of cases reveals
an almost equal diversity in judicial
sentences. In a fairly recent Florida
case, a man convicted of his second
offense of drunkenness was sentenced
to "hard labor in the state prison for
a period of fifteen months."5 5 An Iowa
court held that one year's imprisonment
was not too severe where a drunken
driver had injured the occupant of
another car.5 6 Not long thereafter,
another Iowa court was sustained in
its sentence of one year's imprisonment
for drunken driving where no one was
injured, but the defendant had pre7
viously been convicted of bootlegging.
An Oklahoma court reduced a year's
sentence to six months, on the ground
that there was no collision, and no
of detention (not a jail) and released when
sober. This is regarded not as a penal measure
but rather as one of public safety. Law of Oct.
1, 1917, sec. 15. Petite Coll. Dalloz, p. 369.

Ann. Laws, Vol. 9, ch. 272, sec. 45.
fir Frazier v. S. 1924, 100 So. 155.
54

56 S. v. Fahey, 207 N. W. 608.
57 S. v. Dillard, 1928, 221 N. W. 817.
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damage. 58 Thus, the reputation of the
offender, his criminal record, if any,
and the presence of" any aggravating
circumstances appear to be the general
factors

considered by the courts in

fixing sentences.

These certainly are

pertinent factors; and it may be assumed, further, that intelligent administration mitigates much of the evil of
archaic, ill-conceived statutes.

What

the judges need is information that will
clarify the whole problem of treatment
in drunkenness cases, familiarize them
with the practices in other states as
well as in their own, and bring to their
attention the opinions of informed
scholars as well as the results of careful
researches. We can speak quite definitely concerning the most common of
all sentences-the fine. For it is coming to be generally recognized that this
is the least satisfactory method of punishment; in a vast number of cases, fine
means imprisonment for non-payment.
In a recent study of prison inmates in
Indiana, sentenced for drunkenness, it
was stated that "A majority of the men
were in no position to pay fines, regardless of how small the levy may
have been."5 This tradition of visiting
extra penalties on the poor, present in
the old statute of James I, common in
colonial times, persisting today, needs
to be resolutely attacked; drunkenness
offers as promising a field as any. One
possible reform is suggested by the
New York statute which permits pay60
But
ment of the fine in installments.
5sClark v. S., 1927, 256 P. 941.
59 Ralph Schofield, Mss.
60 Cahill's Consol. Laws, 1930, 41-1221.
61 See The Commitment of Alcoholics to

this hardly represents a fundamental
solution of the problem.
It is difficult to generalize about the
problem of treatment because a great
variety of harms and personalities is
involved; and especially because of the
prevalence of sweeping, fatuous claims
that all would be well quickly if only
we turned the entire matter over to
the experts. The really optimistic datum
is that there is considerable intuitive
understanding of psychological causes
of drunkenness; accordingly, excepting
serious personal injury, there is no
great obstacle to elimination of punitive methods where others are reasonably indicated.
It is frequently assumed that there
exists sufficient knowledge to treat all
inebriates scientifically; there is widespread criticism of present, so-called
legal methods. The usual recommendation fits into the formula: "Don't punish; use the hospital or asylum as in
other recognized diseases." I do not
propose to challenge this diagnosis
now-except as to its unvarying generality. On the one hand, many states
now provide for hospitalization in
cases of chronic drunkenness.6 1 But
the major point is that there is no uniform medical opinion as to the best
treatment for all the various types of
alcoholics. To cite only one instance,
consider the views of Dr. Olaf Kinberg,
a distinguished Swedish psychiatrist.
He argues that only in a small minority
of cases is hospitalization for an extended period appropriate.6
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He asserts

Medical Institutions (1940) 1 Jour. of Studies
on Alcohol 372-387.
62 Olaf Kinberg Alcohol and Criminality, 5
J. Cr. L. and Criminol. (1915) p. 581.
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were under 25 years of age, and that
only 12.5% of those arrested for
drunkenness were under twenty-five.
Compare these with the figures for the
same period showing 63.9% under 25
in arrests for burglary and 72.7% for
auto theft. 6 It is common knowledge
that rehabilitation becomes progressively more difficult as the age of these
offenders increases. Another unfortunate fact is that women form a substantial number of offenders in drunkenness cases. Of 740 women sentenoed
to jails and houses of correction in
Massachusetts in 1935, 405 were sentenced for drunkenness. 67 Similar figures, I think, could be shown elsewhere.
,63
....
etc.
The futility of punitive methods
indefinite,
less
or
more
or
to chronic alcoholic psychoapplied
And he argues that the punishment
6 8
should vary in accordance with the paths is apparent. To many observers
4
This of the endless stream of repeaters who
dangerousness of the offender.
make the round from court-to-jail an
experts
and the like opinions of other
emphasize the unsettled and divergent amazing number of times, it seems
views among qualified specialists con- absurd to continue the existing punicerning the methods of treatment tive methods. That our officials are
seriously deficient in their handling of
which should be adopted.
The problem of treatment is further the difficult problems of chronic
complicated by the fact that the drunkenness and of underlying psychooffenders in drunkenness cases are, as pathic conditions will be generally
a group, much older than others. In a conceded by thoughtful persons. Yet,
study conducted at the Indiana State as noted, the presently popular "soluFarm, it was discovered that 89% of tion" of letting down the punitive bars
those confined for drunkenness were entirely is unsound. The premises
30 years old or older.6 5 National sta- upon which such recommendations rest
tistics covering the first nine months of are two: punitive methods have failed
this year show that 15.2% of those entirely; and, the psychiatrists can
arrested for driving while intoxicated effect cures. Both of these assertions
that "the alcoholic should not and cannot generally be considered as suffering from a disease. A treatment in any
sort medical will therefore not be indicated. On the contrary, the treatment
should be based on the opinion that the
alcoholic is a man who in the majority
of cases can abstan from ethyli.
drinks if you only give him sufficient
motives. When it concerns a criminal
alcoholic these motives need scarcely
be sought elsewhere than among the
means which society already has at its
disposal to react against criminality in
general, to-wit: Payment for damages,
privation of rights, fines, penalties
against liberty, to last a definite time,

63 Id. p. 584. See too, Dr. E. W. McCormick,
Conflicting Medical Testimony in

Cases of

Drunkenness (1937, 101 Justice of Peace, 196).
64 Ibid.

65 Schofield, ross.

6 3rd Quart. Bull. Uniform Crime Reports,

1940.

87 Women and Girl Offenders in Massachusetts (1938) p. 29, pub. by The Mass. Child
Council, Inc.
68 Anderson, The Alcoholic as seen in Court
(1916) 7 J. of Crim. Law & Criminol. 89.
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are over-statements; both suffer from
the error of particularism. Granted,
on the one hand, that most chronic
alcoholics suffer from nervous ailments,
does it follow that punishment has no
utility? Certainly as regards the need
to protect the public, highly competent
opinion can be marshalled to support
the contrary. 69 Secondly, is it a fact
that psychiatrists can remove the
psychopathic condition that is the root
of repeated drunkenness? In some
cases, certainly, in others possibly; in
a great many, assuredly not. I think
we must recognize this frankly; and
recognize also that the limitations on
psychiatric knowledge must condition
legislation and administration of the
law. Beyond that are still enormous
difficulties from the viewpoint of administration of the law. The very
prevalence of chronic drunkenness and
the length of treatment at the hands of
qualified doctors-even when cures are
assured-place great difficulties in the
way of immediate achievement of ideal
laws and administration. Finally the
psychiatrist must realize, as he frequently does not, that there are distinctively legal goals that represent the
achievements of centuries of struggle.
Not infrequently these are at variance
with scientific dictates. Thus, suppose
it is true that a chronic alcoholic can be
cured in five years of confinement;

despite the euphemistic terminology of
recent reform, such treatment is not
only punishment but may be cruel and
inhuman through its very duration.
One "altruistic" alienist argued some
years ago that "The inveterate alcoholics and those with criminal records
should be detained indefinitely."T° It is
impossible here to discuss the effect of
the various values represented in law,
upon the availability of even scientifically demonstrated knowledge. But I
venture to assert that unless scientists
are brought to some awareness of the
nature of the legal problems, their discoveries and their propagandization
may do more harm than good. The
problem as it presents itself to thoughtful persons is always more difficult; it
challenges to preserve the guarantees
of our legal system and at the same
time make such use of science as is
compatable with these social values.
Without the slightest doubt, there is
great room for improvement in the
drunkenness laws, methods of treatment, and administration; many valuable reforms can be adopted that will
not damage the existing political institutions or violate the underlying ethical
ideals. The avenue to their discovery
is collaboration of various scholars and
experts who are fully aware of the
complexity of the problem.

69 See Dr. W. N. East, Alcoholism and Crime
in relation to Manic-Depressive Disorder (1936)
230 Lancet 162-3.

70 Gordon, Prophylactic, Administrative and
Medico-Legal Aspects of Alcoholism (1914) 4
J. Cr. Law and Criminol. 872.

